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Abstract
This article proposes a diﬀerential-game model, in order to analyze
markets in which regional regulation is operative and competition is
based on quality. The case we have in mind is healthcare public ser-
vice, where consumers (patients) choose the provider mainly basing on
the providers’ location and the quality of services, while prices play
a more limited role. In most European countries, within the same
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State, regional (or local) providers compete on quality to attract de-
mand. Market regulation is set at national and/or regional level. Our
model highlights the features of equilibrium in such a framework, and
speciﬁcally investigates how the diﬀerences in product quality evolve
among regions, and how inter-regional demand ﬂows behave. Differen-
tly from some available similar models (that do not take into account
the regional dimension of the decision process), we ﬁnd that quality
diﬀerentials among regions may persist in equilibrium.
Keywords : Healthcare Services; Diagnosis Related Group; Diﬀerential Game;
Quality Competition; Regional Regulators.
Mathematical Subject Classiﬁcation: 91A23, 91A25, 49N90, 91A80, 91B15,
91A10.
JEL Classiﬁcation: C72, C73, I11, I18, L13, R38.
1 Introduction
This article ﬂows within the literature stream dealing with dynamic quality
competition in markets under price regulation. A reference case is given by
healthcare service, where prices are typically regulated, providers compete
on quality, and consumers’ demand choices are mainly driven by product
quality and providers’ location. In healthcare markets, the current relevance
of quality competition is made clear by the fact that many reforms have
implemented over the past years in several countries, with the ﬁnal aim of
increasing the product quality through harsher quality competition among
providers. Generally speaking, such reforms allow the ﬁnal consumers to
choose the provider. Given that prices are regulated (and paid by a Public
Authority, on a prospective payment system, or by insurance companies),
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the consumers’ choices are based on the quality, along with the localization
of the providers (Aiura [1]), rather than price. Thus, the providers have to
compete to attract demand (and payments), by improving the quality of the
oﬀered services. However, our model can be appropriate for other sectors
with similar characteristics, like education or long-term care.
A body of literature exists, focusing on the eﬀect of diﬀerent forms of
competition and diﬀerent regulation mechanisms upon the available quality
level over time: Brekke et al. [4], [5], Siciliani et al. [16] are among the main
references —a review is provided by Brekke et al. [6]. The speciﬁc problems
studied in the mentioned articles range from the dynamic evolution of in-
vestment eﬀorts made by providers and the corresponding available quality
levels, to the relation between regulated prices and investment eﬀorts to
improve quality. Attention is paid to how diﬀerent assumptions concerning
the information sets used by players (and the corresponding game solution
concepts) aﬀect the features of the equilibrium path of control and state
variables, and steady state allocation.
However, in this literature vein, the fact that diﬀerent providers have a
territorial / regional character, and regulation of relevant variables is made
at the regional level, is usually overlooked. In Bisceglia et al. [3] spatial com-
petition, both intra-regional and inter-regional, between providers is studied
by means of a sequential game.
In the present article we aim to merge the mentioned research points
concerning quality competition with a diﬀerent research point, speciﬁcally
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concerning the territorial distribution of the service quality, the regional reg-
ulation, and the eﬀect of decentralization decision processes upon available
quality: the reference literature body —limiting our attention to markets
with regulated prices and quality competition— includes, e.g., Balia et al.
[2], Brekke et al. [7], [8], Levaggi et al. [14], [15].
While the former literature line employs dynamic (or, more speciﬁcally,
diﬀerential) game tools to analyze the evolution of quality over time, the
latter line typically resorts to static —or, at most, repeated or sequential—
games. In the present article we propose a diﬀerential game model with
the main aim of analyzing the implications of decentralized decision pro-
cesses (speciﬁcally, regional regulation) upon the available quality levels.
The model can be interpreted as a combination between models belonging
to the mentioned literature lines; however, its conclusions are far from being
a trivial sum of the points made by available articles. Our model shows that
an equilibrium exists with diﬀerent levels of quality across regions; diﬀer-
ences in quality are permanent, but they may shrink or enlarge over time,
also depending on the decision rules taken by the regulators. The model
we present is analytically solvable thanks to its linear-quadratic structure;
it provides some insights on the problems faced by providers and regional
regulators in markets with quality competition and price regulation.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 presents the model
set-up. Section 3 presents, discusses and compares the open-loop and the
feedback closed-loop solution of the game, assuming that regional regulators
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choose the investments able to move the quality. Section 4 presents a modi-
ﬁcation of the model, assuming that investments in quality are set by the
providers, that are interested in proﬁt rather than social welfare. Section 5
mentions further possible modiﬁcations, and concludes.
2 The model set-up
The basic set-up of the model is common to a number of available articles
based on the Hotelling (1929) linear city model (see Calem and Rizzo [10],
as a seminal contribution for the literature relevant to this present analysis;
see also Brekke et al. [4]).
Consider a market with two providers located at either end of the unit
line S = [0, 1]. On this line segment there is a uniform distribution of con-
sumers, with total mass equal to 1. Since our reference example is healthcare
provison, we will even refer to hospitals and patients for providers and con-
sumers, respectively. Assuming that each consumer inelastically demands
one unit of the considered service, the utility of a consumer located at x ∈ S
and buying from provider i, located at zi ∈ {0, 1}, is given by
U (x, zi) = v + kqi − τ |x− zi| , (1)
where v > 0 is a parameter representing the gross valuation of consumption,
qi is the quality of the product (service) oﬀered by provider i, k > 0 is a
parameter measuring the marginal willingness to pay for quality, and τ > 0
is the marginal transportation cost. In what follows we set k = 1 without
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loss of generality. Notice that in the case of competition among hospitals,
it makes sense to assume that physical locations are ﬁxed; the fact that
locations are at the end points of the line is immaterial to our conclusions.
Since the distance between providers is equal to one, the consumer who is
indiﬀerent between i and j is located at xDi , is characterised by
v − τxDi + qi = v − τ

1− xDi

+ qj , (2)
so that the demand for provider i is:
xDi (t) =
1
2
+
qi(t)− qj(t)
2τ
(3)
The demand is consistent with the assumptions of uniform consumer dis-
tribution (with mass 1), exogenous locations of providers and full market
coverage. We call 1 and 2 the provider located at 0 and 1, respectively.
We propose here to introduce the assumption that the linear space S
is administratively divided into two regions, called R1 and R2: consumers
located between 0 and 1/2 belong to region R1, and consumers located
between 1/2 and 1 belong to region R2. Again, the provider located at
0 and 1, will be indexed by 1 and 2, respectively, as they are under the
administrative control of regulator of R1 and R2, respectively. Thus, each
region has one regulator and one provider within its administrative space.
We can split the demand for each provider into two components, corres-
ponding to “domestic" and “extra-regional" demand; formally: xDi = x
i
i+x
j
i ,
where xii is the domestic demand (demand from residents in Ri met by the
provider located in the same Ri) and x
j
i is the demand for provider i coming
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from residents in Region j. Speciﬁcally, we have:
xii =
1
2
− qj − qi
2τ
, xji = 0 if qi ≤ qj
xii =
1
2
, xji =
qi − qj
2τ
if qi > qj
that is,
xii = min

1
2
,
1
2
− qj − qi
2τ

, xji = max

0,
qi − qj
2τ

.
Following available models, we assume that the cost function of each
provider is linear in the quantity, and quadratic in the quality levels (q) and
investment to improve quality levels (I); cost may also include a ﬁxed cost:
Ci = cixi +
β
2
q2i +
γ
2
I2i + Fi (4)
where ci, β, γ and Fi are positive parameters. Notice that we assume that
constant marginal costs ci and ﬁxed cost Fi may diﬀer across regions; this
corresponds to the fact that institutional (organizational) aspects matter on
the cost structure (and it is well known that diﬀerences in eﬃciency between
hospitals in diﬀerent regions exist). Parameters β and γ are assumed to be
equal across regions, to easy the analytics. In what follows, γ is normalized
to 1 without loss of generality.
Each hospital receives a price pi (ﬁxed by the domestic regional reg-
ulator) for each unit of produced service consumed by domestic patients,
while the price for extra-regional treatment, p, is exogenously set by a cent-
ral authority. This set of assumptions is consistent with what happens in the
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health system of several countries, like Italy or Spain, where regional regu-
lators set the price for domestic treatment, while a system of centrally ﬁxed
prices hold for extra-regional treatments; moreover, hospitals may receive
from the domestic regulator a possible lump-sum transfer to break-even, if
the operative proﬁt is negative.
Following the mentioned diﬀerential game literature, we assume that that
demand is decided by each consumer at each instant of time t ∈ [0,+∞).
The services’ quality levels move over time, thanks to investment I aimed
at improving quality. At the beginning, quality levels are q1(0) = q01 >
q2(0) = q02 > 0, i.e., the quality level of the provider located in R1 is higher
than the quality level of provider of R2. Then, the dynamics of quality is
ruled by the following equation:
q˙i = Ii − δqi (5)
where δ > 0 is a depreciation rate. Note that no externalities are at work
across regions, and the service quality level of each provider only depends
on his investment eﬀorts (apart form the initial conditions).
Models in mentioned available literature diﬀer as far as the objective
functions concern. In some models, proﬁt-oriented (or partially altruistic or
motivated) providers aim at their own maximum result, while regulator(s)
care(s) about social welfare; in other models, there is no distinction between
provider and regulator, as far as the objective function concerns. In the main
version of the present model (Section 3), we adopt the latter (and simpler)
assumption that each regulator, aiming at maximizing the social welfare of
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his own region, sets the quality level; a modiﬁcation, where providers aiming
at maximum proﬁt set the quality levels, is developed in Section 4. Diﬀerent
assumptions can be considered as well in diﬀerent formulations of the model.
3 regional regulators as quality setters
Since we are mainly interested in studying the dynamics of regional diﬀer-
ences in quality of oﬀered services, and the dynamics of regional mobility of
consumers, we start by keeping the model as simple as possible: we assume
that the regulators set the quality (in fact, they set the investments able
to move the quality);1 moreover, each regional regulator takes into account
the surplus of the citizens of its own region, and the proﬁt of the hospital
located within the region, along with the (public) expenditure borne by him-
self. Formally, the instantaneous objective function of Region i at tome t
is:
Πi(t) = σi(t) + πi(t)−Gi
where σi is the surplus of residents in Region i; πi is the proﬁt of the hospital
located in region i and Gi is the public expenditure for the service, that
is, the payment from the regulator to the domestic (and possibly to the
extra-regional) hospital; Gi may also include a lump-sum transfer to the
provider of the same region i, to reach the break-even point, in the case
of a negative operative proﬁt. Since revenues for the hospital coming from
1See Cellini and Lamantia [11] as a model, sharing some characteristics with the present
one, in which regulators set miminum quality standard instead of quality levels.
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domestic treatment (pix
i
i) are paid by the same regulator, this sum will not
appear in the objective function. In this set of assumptions we follow Siciliani
et al. [16]. Diﬀerently, sums paid by a region to the other region enter the
objective function of both regulators (of course, with opposite sign). Still
following Siciliani et al. [16], an opportunity cost λ > 0 is associated to
the public expenditure diﬀerent from the transfer covering the payment for
domestic treatment pix
i
i. Thus,
σ1(t) =
	 1
2
0
(v + q1 − τx)dx (6)
σ2(t) =
	 1
2
+
q1−q2
2τ
1
2
(v + q1 − τx)dx+
	 1
1
2
+
q1−q2
2τ
[v + q2 − τ(1− x)] dx (7)
π1(t)−G1(t) = −(1 + λ)[c1(1
2
+
q1 − q2
2τ
) +
β
2
q21 +
1
2
I21 ] + p(
q1 − q2
2τ
) (8)
π2(t)−G2(t) = −(1+λ)[c2(1
2
− q1 − q2
2τ
)+
β
2
q22+
1
2
I22 ]−(1+λ)p(
q1 − q2
2τ
) (9)
Hence, the dynamic problem of Region i is:
max
Ii≥0
	 ∞
0
e−ρtΠi(t)dt
q˙i = Ii − δqi, qi(0) = qi0
q˙j = Ij − δqj, qj(0) = qj0
Notice that there is no diﬀerence, in this framework, between regulator
and provider: the regulator sets the provider’s investment aimed to improve
the quality level of the produced service. The regulator also sets the unit
price for the service delivered to domestic residents. However, the entailed
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public expenditure, pix
i
i, corresponds to revenue for the provider, so that its
amount is immaterial to the objective function, and prices pi (i = 1, 2) do
not enter the problems (this feature disappears from more complex version
of the model, such as the formulation presented in Section 4).
Quality levels aﬀect the demand and hence the inter-regional patients’
mobility, along with the production costs. Clearly, interdependence between
the two regulator’s problems does exist, as long as the state variable of a
player enters the problem of the other player. Hence, we are in front of a
diﬀerential game.
We solve this diﬀerential game under two diﬀerent assumptions concern-
ing the information set used by the players, and correspondingly we depict
the equilibrium under two diﬀerent solution concepts. Firstly, we ﬁnd the
open-loop solution, where both players are assumed to be unable to observe
the evolution of state variables over time, and they compute the optimal path
of the choice variables at the beginning of time, and then stick to this solu-
tion forever. The open-loop solution is of type Ii(t) = f(t; qi0, qj0). Secondly,
we will ﬁnd the Markovian closed-loop feedback solution, where each player
is assumed to be able to observe the dynamic evolution of state variables,
and the optimal value of the choice variable depends on the current value
of state variables, so that the solution is of type: Ii(t) = f(t, qi(t), qj(t)).
Features, pros and cons of these solution concepts are widely discussed in
the diﬀerential game literature (see, e.g., Dockner et al. [13]); feedback solu-
tions are strongly time consistent, while open-loop solutions are, in general,
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only weakly time consistent.
3.1 Open Loop Solution
We are interested in studying the dynamics of the model in the presence of
asymmetry between providers. The assumption of asymmetry can be seen
as a novelty with respect to available models (like Brekke et al. [4], [5]
or Siciliani et al. [16] where symmetry across providers is assumed). To
ﬁx the reference point, we introduce the following Assumptions, entailing
that Region 1 is the more eﬃcient, hence with the higher quality level, and
attracting consumers from the other region.
Assumptions
τ >
1
2β(λ+ 1)
(10)
c1 < c2 − λ
λ+ 1
p (11)
Of course, situation (and conclusions) could be reversed, switching Re-
gion 1 with 2 and viceversa.
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions (10)-(11), the pair of strategies (I1(t), I2(t)),
solving the following ODE system in the state-control variables, is an Open
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Loop Nash Equilibrium:
I˙1 = (ρ+ δ)I1 +
1
1+λ


β(λ+ 1)q1 +
c1(λ+ 1)− p
2τ
− 1
2

I˙2 = (ρ+ δ)I2 +
1
1+λ


β(λ+ 1)q2 +
q1 − q2
2τ
+
(c2 − p)(λ+ 1)
2τ
− 1
2

q˙1 = I1 − δq1
q˙2 = I2 − δq2
(12)
With initial conditions: q1(0) = q01 > q2(0) = q02 > 0.
The equilibrium point of this linear system is given by:
IOLi = δq
OL
i , i = 1, 2
where qOLi are the open-loop steady state quality levels given by
qOL1 =
p+ τ − c1(λ+ 1)
2τ(λ+ 1)(δ2 + δρ+ β)
qOL2 =
2τ(δ2 + δρ+ β)(λ+ 1)[(p− c2)(λ+ 1) + τ ] + c1(λ+ 1)− p− τ
2τ(δ2 + δρ+ β)(λ+ 1)[2τ(δ2 + δρ+ β)(λ+ 1)− 1]
and it constitutes a saddle point.
Proof. See Appendix A.
It is interesting to note that the steady state level of the quality produced
by the provider in R1 (with the higher quality level) does not depend on the
cost parameter c2 pertaining to the provider of the other region, while the
opposite does not hold: the steady-state quality produced in R2 is aﬀected
by the cost structure of the provider with higher quality too. Technically,
this is consistent with the fact that in system (12) only c1 and q1 appear
in the dynamic equation pertaining to I1, while both q1 and q2, along with
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c2, appear in the dynamics of I2. From a substantial point of view, this is
due to the assumption that the provider of Region 1 is (and remains) the
more eﬃcient one. Thus, since the provider of Region 1 is aware that he
serves the whole domestic market and attracts consumers from the other
region, the cost structure of Region 2 does not aﬀect the optimal choice
of the provider of Region 1. On the opposite, the quality level of provider
1 (inﬂuenced by his own cost structure) aﬀects the amount of residents of
Region 2 who decide to migrate, and hence aﬀects the optimal investment
decision of provider 2.
Consistently with the quality diﬀerential between the two providers in
steady state, the steady-state inter-regional demand ﬂow, constituted by
residents of R2 who demand the service from the provider of R1, turns out
to be equal to
(x21)
OL =
qOL1 − qOL2
2τ
=
(1 + λ)(c2 − c1)− λp
2τ [2τ(1 + λ)(δ2 + δρ+ β)− 1]
As far as the dynamics of such inter-regional ﬂow is concerned, we can simply
notice that, since the steady state quality levels do not depend on the initial
ones, we can have a higher or a lower equilibrium quality gap between the
two regions with respect to the initial value, and this obviously results in a
higher or lower inter-regional patients ﬂow.
Simple comparative statics provide the following results concerning steady
state allocation.
As to the eﬀect of τ on quality levels and inter-regional migrational ﬂow,
it is easy to check that:
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∂qOL1
∂τ
=
c1(1 + λ)− p
2 τ2 (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β

∂qOL2
∂τ
=
c1(1 + λ)− p
2 τ2 (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
+2 (λ+ 1) (p− (λ+ 1) (c1 − c2 + p)) δ2 + ρ δ + β
2 τ (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
− 12
∂(x21)
OL
∂τ
=
− p− (λ+ 1) (c1 − c2 + p)
2 τ2

2 τ (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
− 1−(λ+ 1) (p− (λ+ 1) (c1 − c2 + p))

δ2 + ρ δ + β

τ

2 τ (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
− 12
It results
∂qOL1
∂τ
< 0 if p > c1(1 + λ). The economic meaning is immediate:
lower travel cost entail harsher competition (as discussed in several contri-
butions, including Siciliani et al. [16]); harsher competition leads to higher
quality levels, if unit price is suﬃciently high, and providers have a ﬁnancial
incentive to attract extra-regional demand. On the opposite, if the regulated
unit price is “too low" (and ﬁnancial losses are entailed by serving the mar-
ket), harsher competition leads providers to exert lower eﬀorts to increase
quality, since higher demand would entail lower revenues. Our present result
perfectly mimics the outcome in Siciliani et al. [16], where -in subsection
3.2.2- a brief discussion is provided on cases in which policy measures aimed
at increasing competition have been based on travel cost reduction, for in-
stance by reimbursing consumers/patients who choose to move to diﬀerent
regions. Clearly, such policy measures succeed in obtaining the expected in-
crease of quality levels, only if they are associated to suﬃciently high price
for the service.
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Similarly, note that
∂qOL2
∂τ
< 0 if p >
(λ+ 1)
λ
(c2 − c1), which can be
interpreted in the same way as explained above for the quality of the provider
of R1. Under the same parametric condition, it holds that
∂qOL2
∂τ
>
∂qOL1
∂τ
.
Moreover, condition τ >
1
2(δ2 + δρ+ β)(λ+ 1)
and p >
(λ+ 1)
λ
(c2 − c1)
are suﬃcient to ensure that (x21)
OL > 0, and
∂(x21)
OL
∂τ
< 0. This means
that harsher competition (i.e., lower τ) leads to higher quality levels in
both regions, but to a larger quality diﬀerential too: the region with lower
marginal cost (and higher initial quality) increases the steady state quality
by a larger amount, in front of lower consumers’ travel cost, so that the
amount of inter-regional migration increases. If we imagine that τ can be
reduced through appropriate pro-competition policies, then such policies
are beneﬁcial for the available quality levels, but they entails larger quality
diﬀerences and larger patient mobility.
As to the eﬀect of p, the centrally regulated price for extra-regional
treatment, we have:
∂qOL1
∂p
=
1
2 τ (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
 > 0
∂qOL2
∂p
=
λ
2 τ (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
− 1 + 12 τ (λ+ 1) δ2 + ρ δ + β
∂(x21)
OL
∂p
= − λ
2 τ

2 τ (λ+ 1)

δ2 + ρ δ + β
− 1
An increase of the price for extra-regional treatment leads to higher qual-
ity levels in the most eﬃcient region, that attracts extra-regional demand.
The same eﬀect on the quality in the less eﬃcient region occurs only if
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condition τ >
1
2(δ2 + δρ+ β)(λ+ 1)
is met. Under the same condition it
results:
∂(x21)
OL
∂p
< 0. Verbally, under high transport cost, an increase of the
price for extra-regional treatment leads the region with lower quality level
to exert higher eﬀort to increase its quality, in order to reduce the number
of its citizens who decide to migrate to buy the service; on the opposite,
if transportation costs are low, the less eﬃcient region ﬁnds it convenient
to reduce its quality level, inducing its citizens to buy the service from the
provider of the other region.
3.2 Feedback Solution
Assumptions We must again assume that τ is greater than the threshold
speciﬁed in (10). In addition to this, for ρ→ 0, it must also hold:
c1 < c2

1− 1
X
+ p

1
λ+ 1
−

1− 1
X

(13)
where X is deﬁned as:
X := 2τ(λ+ 1)(β + δ2) > 0 (14)
and where 1− 1X > 0; and 1λ+1 −

1− 1X > 0 if τ < λ+12(β+δ2)[(λ+1)2−1] .
Under these Assumptions, we will explain later, the following Proposition
provides a linear Feedback Nash Equilibrium of the considered diﬀerential
game.
Proposition 2 A linear FNE is given by the following couple of strategies
(I1, I2):
I1 =
1
1 + λ
(α1 + α3q1) (15)
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I2 =
1
1 + λ
(k1 + k3q2 + k5q1) (16)
where, deﬁning2:
A := τ(λ+ 1)[4β + (2δ + ρ)2]− 2 (17)
we have:
α3 =
λ+ 1
2
[(2δ + ρ)−

4β + (2δ + ρ)2] (18)
k3 =

λ+ 1
4τ
[

τ(λ+ 1)(2δ + ρ)−
√
A] (19)
k5 =

λ+ 1
4τ
[
√
A−√A+ 2] = −k4 (20)
α1 =
Nα1
Dα1
, k1 =
Nk1
Dk1
(21)
with:
Nα1 =
√
τ(
√
A+ ρ
√
τ
√
λ+ 1)

4β + (2δ2 + ρ)2 − ρ√τ
√
A+
+4β
√
λ+ 1(p− c1(λ+1))−
√
λ+ 1(4c1δ(δ+ρ)(λ+1)−4δ2p−ρ(4δp−ρτ))
Dα1 = 4
√
τ(β + δ(δ + ρ))(
√
A+ ρ

τ(λ+ 1))
Nk1 =

τ(4β + 4δ2 + 4δρ+ ρ2)[ρ

Aτ(λ+ 1)+2β(λ+1)(c1(λ+1)−p+τ)+2c1δ(δ+ρ)(λ+1)2+
+2δ2(λ+ 1)(τ − p) + 2δρ(λ+ 1)(τ − p) + ρ2τ(λ+ 1)− 1]+
−[

A(λ+ 1)(2β(c1(λ+1)+λ(c2−p)−2p+c2)+2c1δ(δ+r)(λ+1)−2δ2(λ(p−c2)+2p−c2)+
2Note that, for ρ→ 0 : A = 2(X − 1).
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−ρ(2δ(λ(p−c2)+2p−c2)−ρτ))−ρ
√
τ(2(λ+1)((λ+1)(p−c2)−τ))(β+δ2+δρ)−ρ2τ(λ+1)+1)]
Dk1 = 4
√
τ (ρ
√
τ(β+δ(δ+ρ))

A(λ+ 1)+2β2τ(λ+1)+β(τ(λ+1)(2δ+ρ)2−1)+
+δ(2δ3τ(λ+ 1) + 4δ2ρτ(λ+ 1) + δ(3ρ2τ(λ+ 1)− 1) + ρ(ρ2τ (λ+ 1)− 1)))
Proof. See Appendix B.
Steady state qualities are thus given by:
qF1 =
α1
δ(λ+ 1)− α3
qF2 =
k1 + k5q
F
1
δ(λ+ 1)− k3
In this framework their analytic expressions are really cumbersome and
intractable; hence in the remainder of this section we will focus on the
particular case when the discount rate is negligible.
Remark 1 Notice that Assumption (10) ensures k3 < 0, which in turn
implies that the ﬁrst order condition provides a maximum point for the RHS
of the HJB equation of the less eﬃcient hospital (see Appendix B).
From (15) and (16) it follows that
qF1 > q
F
2 ⇐⇒ qF1 >
k1
δ(λ+ 1)− (k3 + k5)
Therefore, recalling that 0 > α3 = k3+k5, a suﬃcient condition for q
F
1 > q
F
2
is:
α1 > k1
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Furthermore, since the equilibrium point of the linear system in (q1, q2)
that we obtain from the FNE strategies and the quality levels dynamics is a
stable node (see Appendix B), implying monotonic trajectories for the quality
levels, the considered assumption is also a suﬃcient condition for qF1 (t) >
qF2 (t), ∀t ∈ [0,∞). Also in this case, since the steady-state qualities do not
depend on the initial quality levels, there may be an increase or a decrease
in the inter-regional migrational ﬂow over time.
Since, given the cumbersome expressions for α1 and k1 in the general
case with ρ > 0, it is really diﬃcult to state the assumption α1 > k1 in
a convenient and meaningful form, we limit our attention to the particular
case where ρ→ 0, obtaining Assumption (13).
For ρ→ 0 we obtain the following steady-state qualities:
qF1 =

τ(X − 1) + (p− c1(λ+ 1))

2(β + δ2)(λ+ 1)
2
√
τ(β + δ2)(λ+ 1)
√
X − 1
qF2 =
NqF
2
DqF
2
where
NqF
2
=

2(β + δ2)3(λ+ 1)(X − 1)(c1(λ+ 1)− p) + 4Bβ3τ3/2(λ+ 1)2+
+2β2
√
τ(λ+ 1)[6Bδ2τ(λ+ 1)− (B + τ)]+
+β
√
τ(12Bδ4τ(λ+1)2−4δ2(λ+1)(B+τ)+1)+δ2√τ(2δ2τ(λ+1)−1)(2Bδ2(λ+1)−1)
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with B := (λ+ 1)(p− c2) + τ , and
DqF
2
= 2
√
τ(β+δ2)(λ+1)(X−1)(2β2τ(λ+1)+β(4δ2τ(λ+1)−1)+δ2(2δ2τ(λ+1)−1))
For ρ→ 0 we also have3:
∂qF1
∂p
=
1
X(X − 1) > 0
∂qF2
∂p
=
1
(1−X)√X[2τ(λ+ 1)[(β + δ2)2 + 2βδ2]− (β + δ2)] ·{(β+δ
2)3/2
√
X − 1+
−2β3τ(λ+ 1)2

8τ(λ+ 1) + β2(λ+ 1)3/2
√
2τ(1− 6δ2τ(λ+ 1))+
+2
√
2τβδ2(λ+ 1)3/2(1− 3δ2τ (λ+ 1))−
√
2τδ4(λ+ 1)3/2(2δ2τ(λ+ 1)− 1)}
this quantity is positive if4:
X(X−1) > 1
(λ+ 1)2
⇐⇒ τ <

(λ+ 1)2 + 4− (λ+ 1)
4(β + δ2)(λ+ 1)2
or τ >

(λ+ 1)2 + 4 + (λ+ 1)
4(β + δ2)(λ+ 1)2
It is interesting to note that an increase of the exogenous price of extra-
regional treatment has a clear (and positive) impact on the quality of the
service provided in R1, the region with the higher quality level (and hence
attracting the extra-regional demand), while the eﬀect can be positive or
negative upon the quality of the service provided in R2, the region with
the lower quality level. The intuition runs as follows. The region with the
higher quality has a clear incentive to increase the amount of extra-regional
treatment, since the marginal gain is positive and increasing in p. The
3 It is easy to prove that the derivative of the steady-state quality of the most eﬃcient
region w.r.t. the price p is positive also in the general case with ρ > 0.
4Both these thresholds are in general compatible with Assumption (10).
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region with lower quality level, that has to pay for extra-regional treatments,
could ﬁnd it convenient to reduce the extra-regional patients’ ﬂow, or to
increase it, depending on the relation between parameters connected with
costs (transport cost, operative cost, opportunity cost). Consistently, the
eﬀect of an increase of p upon the size of inter-regional ﬂow is
∂x21
∂p
=
[
√
X − (λ+ 1)√X − 1]
2τ (X − 1)3/2
and this derivative is positive if:
τ <
λ+ 1
2λ(λ+ 2)(β + δ2)
Finally, one can check that
∂qF1
∂τ
=
[c1(λ+ 1)− p](2X − 1)
2τ(X − 1)3/2√X < 0 ⇐⇒ p > c1(λ+ 1)
exactly as it is for the Open Loop case.
3.3 A comparison between steady-state qualities for ρ→ 0
It is easy to check that
qOL1 − qF1 = [p− c1(λ+ 1)]
√
X − 1−√X
X
√
X − 1
where X is given in (14); therefore:
qF1 > q
OL
1 ⇐⇒ p > c1(λ+ 1)
The result emerges, according to which the stronger competition entailed by
the feedback behavior rule (as compared to open-loop rule) leads to a higher
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level of steady state quality, in the region with the higher quality level, at
least for suﬃciently high price level of extra-regional treatment. However,
this conclusion does not apply to the provider with the lower quality level;
indeed:
qOL2 − qF2 = (p− c1(λ+ 1))
(β + δ2)

X(X − 1)− Y
X(X − 1)Y
where Y := 2β2τ(λ+ 1) + β[1− 4δ2τ(λ+ 1)]− δ2[2δ2τ(λ+ 1)− 1].
Since we have:
(β+δ2)
√
X(X−1)−Y
X(X−1)Y > 0 ⇐⇒ τ [
√
X−1−
√
X]
(X−1)3/2 < 0, it follows:
qOL2 > q
F
2 ⇐⇒ p > c1(λ+ 1)
Thus, under a suﬃciently high price p, the region with the lower quality level
arrives at a steady state in which quality is lower under the feedback behavior
rule as compared to the open-loop rule. Hence, a harsher competition (as
captured by closed-loop behaviour of players instead of open-loop behavior
rule) results in a lower quality level in the less eﬃcient region.
Hence, still limiting attention to steady state, in the presence of a suf-
ﬁciently high price p, quality diﬀerential between regions is larger under
feedback behaviors than under open-loop. Formally, for p > c1(λ + 1), we
have:
qF1 − qF2 > qOL1 − qOL2 =⇒ (x21)F > (x21)OL
while the opposite holds for p < c1(λ + 1). Verbally, stronger competition
in the form of feedback behaviour of providers, instead of open-loop be-
havior, leads to a larger quality diﬀerential between regions and hence to
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larger inter-regional ﬂow. This consequence is usually overlooked by current
debates on pros and cons of competition in healthcare markets and new gov-
ernance of national health systems, and regulation of markets where quality
competition takes place. Our model makes clear that distance matters, and
travel costs play a role in individual and social welfare consideration.
4 Extension: a model with providers as quality
setters
In the version of the model above, prices p1 and p2 do not enter the problem
of the regulators, as they have only redistributive eﬀects. This assumption
can be easily removed, to show that the levels of price set at the regional
level may have relevant impact on quality (and hence demand). An easy way
to show this point is to assume, as in Brekke et al. [4], that the providers
choose the investment level at each instant in time, taking price (p1 and p2,
in this case) as known; in such a case, objective function to maximize for
provider Hi is:
Ji =
	 ∞
0
πi(t)e
−ρt dt
where instantaneous proﬁt is:
πi = (pi − ci)xDi −
γ
2
I2i −
β
2
q2i
Notice that provider i receives pi for each case treated; however, Region i
pays for each consumer belonging to Ri, while the same amount pi is paid
from region Rj for any patient belonging to x
j
i . Notice also that, for the sake
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of easiness, we assume that the objective function of each provider is simply
its own proﬁt, without taking into account the wide body of considerations
supporting the occurrence of motivated (i.e., semi-altruistic) providers (see,
e.g., Siciliani et al. [16] and references therein).
As in the model presented in the previous section, control variable is in-
vestment in quality, which aﬀects the quality level, according to equation (5),
again given an initial condition q01 > 0, q
0
2 > 0. The following propositions
provide the OLNE and the linear FNE of the model into consideration.
Proposition 3 The ODE system in the state-control variables that an Open
Loop Nash Equilibrium strategies pair (I1(t), I2(t)) solves is given by:
I˙i = (ρ+ δ)Ii + βqi − pi − ci
2τ
q˙i = Ii − δqi
(22)
with i = 1, 2. The equilibrium point of this linear system is given by:
IOLi = δq
OL
i , i = 1, 2
qOLi =
pi − ci
2τ(δ2 + δρ+ β)
and it constitutes a saddle point.
Proof. The proof is omitted since it is analogous to that provided in Brekke
et al. [4] for the case of constant marginal treatment costs with ϕ = 0 and
γ = 1 but allowing for diﬀerent coeﬃcients pi and ci.
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Proposition 4 A linear FNE strategy for provider Hi, i ∈ {1, 2}, is given
by:
Ii(t) = ϕi + ωqi(t)
where:
ϕi =
pi − ci
τ

4β + (ρ+ 2δ)2
ω = δ +
ρ
2
−

β +

δ +
ρ
2
2
Proof. The proof is omitted since it employs the same technique shown in
Appendix B and it yields a solution analogous to that obtained by Brekke
et al. [4] for the considered case with diﬀerent treatment marginal costs ci
and prices pi across hospitals.
Note that our solution constitutes the only linear FNE in which the
control chosen, in every time instant, by each hospital depends only on the
current value of its own quality level (and on the price chosen by its Region).
From the FNE strategies, by using the state variable dynamic, we obtain
the time-path of the quality level for Hi:
qi(t) =


q0i −
pi − ci
2τ(δ2 + β + ρδ)

e
ρ
2
−

β+
ρ
2
+ δ
2t
+
pi − ci
2τ(δ2 + β + ρδ)
(23)
Suﬃcient condition for qi(t) > 0 is pi > ci. It holds:
∆q(t) = [∆q0 − ∆p−∆c
2τ(δ2 + β + ρδ)
]e

ρ
2
−

β+
ρ
2
+ δ
2t
+
∆p−∆c
2τ(δ2 + β + ρδ)
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where:
∆q(t) := q1(t)− q2(t), ∆q0 := q01 − q02, ∆p := p1 − p2, ∆c := c1 − c2.
Since we have: ρ2 −

β +
ρ
2
+ δ
2
< 0, in steady-state it holds that: ∆q >
0 ⇐⇒ ∆p > ∆c, and furthermore the steady-state values coincide with
those obtained in the open-loop case, as in Brekke et al. [4].
Let us consider, without loss of generality: ∆q0 > 0. Consequently it is
realistic to consider also ∆c < 0. It holds:
1. if ∆p > ∆c then ∀t ∈ [0,∞) : ∆q(t) > 0;
2. if ∆p < ∆c then ∆q(t) > 0 for all t < t¯, where:
t¯ =
ln

∆p−∆c
(∆p−∆c)−∆q0[2τ(δ2 + β + ρδ)]


ρ
2
−

β +
ρ
2
+ δ
2 (24)
while for all t > t¯ we have: ∆q(t) < 0. Not surprisingly, t¯ is increas-
ing in the initial quality diﬀerence and in the marginal disutility of
traveling and it is decreasing in the term ∆p−∆c.
Finally we notice that, as in the symmetric model of Brekke et al. [4],
and diﬀerently from the model presented in the previous section, the open-
loop and the feedback solutions lead to the same steady-state values.
The interest of the version of the model presented in this section rests in
the fact that it shows that quality diﬀerential between regions may switch
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its algebraic sign at a point in time, in front of speciﬁc parameters’ con-
ﬁguration: a “too low" regulated price level may induce the more eﬃcient
provider to select investment plans that lead to a lower quality as compared
to the other region’s provider. The further step left to future research, con-
sists in considering regional prices as endogenous, and set by the regulators
in order to maximize a social welfare function, diﬀerent from the objective
function of providers.
5 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have proposed a diﬀerential game model to highlight the
role of local regulation in a market where prices are given and competition
is based on quality. We have shown that quality diﬀerential across region
can persist, under equilibrium conditions. We have studied the relations
between regulated price levels, and quality levels and dynamics. Of course,
quality levels aﬀect demand and hence inter-regional mobility. Our theoret-
ical model has a clear empirical counterpart in healthcare markets, as well as
in other markets like childcare, long-term care, or even education (especially
at the primary and secondary school levels), with very similar characterist-
ics as healthcare: competition among providers bases on quality rather than
price; consumers’ choices are driven by location and quality of providers.
From a mathematical viewpoint, both the model of Section 3 and its
variant in Section 4 are linear-quadratic diﬀerential games with one control
variable for each player (Ii) and two state variables (q1 and q2), which have
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very simple dynamics. The setting is simple enough to let us to derive ana-
lytically the Open Loop and the linear Feedback Nash Equilibria of those
games. However, it is interesting to notice that they are not linear-state
games (see Dockner et al. [13]), since the instantaneous pay-oﬀ functions
are not linear in the state variables: this implies that the Open loop Nash
equilibria are not sub-game perfect. In particular we have a saddle-point
equilibrium in both the models, implying that, given the initial quality levels,
we can ﬁnd initial values of the co-state variables (which in turn determine
the initial optimal investment choices) such that the system converges to
the steady state as time approaches inﬁnity. Conversely, in the correspond-
ing games with feedback information pattern, we considered the stationary
linear FNE (which is, by deﬁnition, a sub-game perfect equilibrium) which
stabilizes the states for every possible initial condition. Interestingly, these
two diﬀerent equilibrium paths lead to the same steady-state framework in
the model of Section 4, while this is not the case for the model of Section
3. In both the models there is asymmetry between the players, but the
degree of asymmetry is much bigger in the ﬁrst one, in which the players
ex-ante “know” that the most eﬃcient one will always have higher quality
levels (so they have diﬀerent objective functionals form), and this leads to
the feature that -for both the obtained equilibria- the equilibrium strategy
of this player -diﬀerently from what happens for the less eﬃcient one- does
not explicitly depend on the state variable of the other one. Conversely, the
model presented in Section 4 -which is a generalization of Brekke et al. [4]
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work- is characterized by the fact that both in the open loop and in the lin-
ear feedback Nash equilibrium with asymptotically stable steady-state, the
strategy of player i does not explicitly depend on the state variable of player
j. In this simpler setting we have also investigated under which conditions
an equilibrium trajectory with inversion of quality levels can occur. Speciﬁc
assumptions concerning the choice variables of regulators lead to diﬀerent
properties of equilibria. From a simple comparison between the models of
Section 3 and 4, one can see that the steady state under open-loop vs. feed-
back behavior rule may coincide or not, depending on whether the quality
is chosen by the regulator or by the (proﬁt-oriented) provider.
Our model can be extended along diﬀerent routes. The most immediate
one is to make the regulated prices endogenous, imagining that prices are set
to maximize some social welfare functions in which regulated prices matter.
In the present version of the model, local prices do not enter the objective
functions of local regulators, and they have a mere redistributive role.
Though very simple, the present version of the model can provide some
policy prescriptions. For instance, pro-competition policies are eﬀective
in fostering available quality of services only under speciﬁc conditions (as
shown, by the way, by other available models with diﬀerent focuses from re-
gional distribution of quality levels and inter-regional consumers’ mobility);
more important, out present model shows that pro-competition policies may
lead to increasing or decreasing quality diﬀerential across regions, depending
on the parameter conﬁguration, that is, the initial framework conﬁguration.
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Thus, our model suggests that the outcome of pro-competitive policy meas-
ures (which have been very popular over the past decades in several western
countries, as applied to markets characterized by quality competition) are
far from having obvious and similar results across diﬀerent countries and
institutional contexts.
A Proof of Proposition 1
In order to ﬁnd an OLNE for the considered diﬀerential game, we apply the
Pontryagin maximum principle. The current Hamiltonian function of player
i, i ∈ {1, 2}, is given by5:
Hi = Πi + µi(Ii − δqi) + φi(Ij − δqj) (25)
where µi and φi are the current co-state variables and the instantaneous
proﬁt functions Πi are obtained by considering equations (6),(7),(8),(9). The
adjoint equations are given by:
µ˙1 = ρµ1−
∂H1
∂q1
=⇒ µ˙1 = (ρ+ δ)µ1+β(λ+1)q1+
c1(λ+ 1)− p
2τ
− 1
2
(26)
φ˙1 = ρφ1 −
∂H1
∂q2
=⇒ φ˙1 = (ρ+ δ)φ1 −
c1(1 + λ)− p
2τ
(27)
µ˙2 = ρµ2−
∂H2
∂q2
=⇒ µ˙2 = (ρ+δ)µ2+β(λ+1)q2+
q1 − q2
2τ
+
(c2 − p)(λ+ 1)
2τ
−1
2
(28)
φ˙2 = ρφ2 −
∂H2
∂q1
=⇒ φ˙2 = (ρ+ δ)φ2 −
(c2 − p)(1 + λ) + q2 − q1
2τ
(29)
5For notational simplicity we omit time dependencies.
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Transversality conditions are: lim
t→∞
e−ρtµiqi = 0, lim
t→∞
e−ρtφiqj = 0. First
order conditions for a maximum point of the Hamiltonian functions give:
∂Hi
∂Ii
= 0 ⇐⇒ µi = (1 + λ)Ii (30)
Please note that the second order conditions are satisﬁed if the Hamiltonian
of each player is concave in its control and state variables. As well known, to
this end, a necessary and suﬃcient condition is that their Hessian matrices
∇2Hi are negative semideﬁnite. Since these Hessian matrices are given by:
∇2H1 =
−(1 + λ) 0
0 −β(1 + λ)

∇2H2 =
−(1 + λ) 0
0 12τ − β(1 + λ)

it is trivial to see that this condition is veriﬁed under Assumption (10).
Diﬀerentiating equation (30) w.r.t. time yields:
µ˙i = (1 + λ)I˙i
which, substituted into (26) and (28), together with the quality stock dy-
namic equations, lead to the linear ODE system given in Proposition 1.
In this system, by imposing I˙i = q˙i = 0, we get the equilibrium point. In
order to determine its nature, we compute the eigenvalues of the coeﬃcient
matrix of the system (12):
λ1 =
ρ
2
+

δ2 + δ ρ+
ρ2
4
+ β
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λ2 =
ρ
2
−

δ2 + δ ρ+
ρ2
4
+ β − 1
2τ(1 + λ)
λ3 =
ρ
2
+

δ2 + δ ρ+
ρ2
4
+ β − 1
2τ(1 + λ)
λ4 =
ρ
2
−

δ2 + δ ρ+
ρ2
4
+ β
furthermore, under Assumption (10), it follows that all these eigenvalues are
real and:
λ4 < λ2 < 0 < λ3 < λ1
therefore we get eigenvalues with positive values and others with negative
values, hence the equilibrium point constitutes a saddle point.
B Proof of Proposition 2
In order Ii(t, qi, qj), with i, j ∈ {1, 2}, i = j, to be a FNE strategy for player
i, we look for a value function V (t, qi, qj), continuously diﬀerentiable, which
satisﬁes the following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation:
ρVi = max
Ii≥0

Πi +
∂Vi
∂qi
(Ii − δqi) + ∂Vi
∂qj
(Ij − δqj)

(31)
The FOC for the maximum point of the RHS of this HJB equation leads to:
Ii =
1
γ(1 + λ)
∂Vi
∂qi
(32)
Such condition is also suﬃcient for a maximum point since the expression to
be maximized in the HJB equation is strictly concave in the control variable.
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In order to ﬁnd a pair of linear stationary feedback strategies that consti-
tute a FNE of the diﬀerential game, we look for two value functions quadratic
w.r.t. q1 and q2:
V1(q1, q2) = α0 + α1q1 + α2q2 +
α3
2
q21 +
α4
2
q22 + α5q1q2 (33)
V2(q1, q2) = k0 + k1q2 + k2q1 +
k3
2
q22 +
k4
2
q21 + k5q1q2 (34)
where α0, . . . , α5, k0, . . . , k5 are unknown coeﬃcients to be determined.
By substituting in the FOC (32) we obtain:
I1 =
1
1 + λ
(α1 + α3q1 + α5q2) (35)
I2 =
1
1 + λ
(k1 + k3q2 + k5q1) (36)
By substituting in the HJB equation of R1 we obtain:
τ [8ρ(λ+ 1)α0 − 4α21 + 4c1(λ+ 1)2 − 8α2k1 + (λ+ 1)(τ − 4v)]+
+[2τα1[δ(λ+1)−α3+ρ(λ+1)]+c1(λ+1)2−2τα2k5−(λ+1)(p+τ)−2τα5k1]q1+
+[−2τα1α5−c1(λ+1)2+2τδα2(λ+1)+2τα2[ρ(λ+1)−k3]+p(λ+1)−2τk1]q2+
+[β(λ+ 1)2 + 2δ(λ+ 1)α3 − α23 + ρ(λ+ 1)α3 − 2α5k5]q21+
+[2δ(λ+ 1)α4 + ρ(λ+ 1)α4 − α25 − 2α4k3]q22+
+[2δ(λ+ 1)α5 − α3α5 + ρ(λ+ 1)α5 − α5k3 − α4k5]q1q2 = 0
Similarly, by substituting in the HJB equation of R2 we obtain:
τ [8α1k2 − (λ+ 1)(8ρk0 + 4λc2 + τ − 4(v − c2)) + 4k21]+
34
+[2τα1k4−2δτ(λ+1)k2+2τα3k2−(λ+1)[λ(p−c2)+2ρτk2+p−c2]+2τα5k1]q1+
+[−2τα1k5+2δτ(λ+1)k1−(λ+1)[λ(p−c2)−2ρτk1+p+τ−c2)−2τ(α5k2+k1k3)]]q2+
+[4δτ(λ+ 1)k4 − 4τα3k4 + (λ+ 1)(2ρτk4 − 1)− 2τk25]q21+
+[2βτ(λ+ 1)2 + 4δτ(λ+ 1)k3 + (λ+ 1)(2ρτk3 − 1)− 2τ(2α5k5 + k23)]q22+
+[4δτ(λ+1)k5−2τα3k5+[λ(2ρτk5+1)+2ρτk5+1]−2τα5k4−2τk5k3]q1q2 = 0
For the equality to hold, all the terms in brackets in the above equations
have to be equal to zero.
We concentrate on the last three equations for both the players, which
do not depend on α0, α1, α2, k0, k1, k2, obtaining a non-linear system of 6
equations in 6 unknowns.
A solution of this system gives:
α4 = α5 = 0
k4 =

λ+ 1
4τ
[

τ(λ+ 1)(4β + (2δ + ρ)2)−
√
A]
with A deﬁned by (17), and the values of α3, k3, k5 in equations (18), (19),
(20), respectively.
From this solution we obtain the values for α1 and k1 given in Proposition
26. Finally, by substituting these obtained values into equations (35) and
(36), we get the FNE given in Proposition 2.
6Obviously also the values for α0, α2, k0, k2 can be uniquely determined, but we can
omit them since they do not enter the expression of the FNE strategies.
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In order for the obtained solution to provide a maximum point for our
problem which is also globally asymptotically stable we must impose (see
Brekke et al. [4]):
α3 < 0
α3 + α5 < 0
k3 < 0 ⇐⇒ 4βτ(λ+ 1)− 2 > 0
which results in Assumption (10).
From the FNE strategies and the quality levels dynamic equations we
obtain that the FNE qualities time paths are the solutions of the following
linear ODE system:
q˙1 =
1
1+λ [α1 + (α3 − δ)q1]
q˙2 =
1
1+λ [k1 + k5q1 + (k3 − δ)q2]
The eigenvalues λ1,2 of its coeﬃcient matrix A are real since it holds:
(trA)2 − 4detA = (α3 + k3 − 2δ)
2
(1 + λ)2
− 4(α3 − δ)(k3 − δ)
(1 + λ)2
=
(α3 − k3)2
(1 + λ)2
> 0
Since the equilibrium point is globally asymptotically stable, the conclusion
λ1,2 ∈ R implies that these eigenvalues are negative, therefore the equilib-
rium point of the system is a stable node.
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